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action of employers regardless of the reasonableness or unreasonable-
ness of their conduct. In a Missouri case an employer's refusal to hire
a claimant with a contagious disease was said to be required by public
policy and the claimant was held to be unavailable for work.I How-
ever, public policy, unless enacted into law, does not prevent a worker
from legally performing work. 9 While employers, for what they think
is in their best interests, or for any reason, may refuse to hire any
worker, such refusal should not affect the availability of workers whom
they refuse to hire, unless such refusal is required by law.
Conclusion.
Statutory requirements of ability to work and availability for work
are stated in such general terms that only by interpretation are they
given meaning. Whether the protection which workers have in an
unemployment compensation law is more than illusory depends on the
character of such interpretations. Only if it is understood that an
unemployment compensation law is a broad public measure, designed
by the payment of benefits to check and ameliorate the effects of
unemployment among workers who are able, willing, and ready to
work will workers be assured the reasonable protection which the
states have provided for them. To paraphrase a statement by justice t
Cardozo, an unemployment compensation law interpreted in such a
way that the unemployed who look to it will be deprived of reason-
able protection is one in name and nothing more."
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The Provision and Its Purpose.
WHEN legislation designed to liberalize benefit payments under
state unemployment compensation laws is proposed, the opposition
58. Wolpers v. Unemployment Camp. Comm., 186 S. W. (2d) 440 (Mo. 1945).
59. In this connection, a Georgia appeals referee has aptly said, "There is nothing in
the Georgia Unemployment Compensation Law which requires the claimant to be free from
either contagious or infectious diseases. It may be that all working people should be free
from contagious or infectious diseases before being permitted to work among other people,
but the Statute we are here concerned with has no such provision." Ben. Ser. 9214-Ga.
A (V8-3).
60. In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 593 (1937), Mr. Justice Cardozo
said, "An unemployment law framed in such a way that the unemployed who look to it
will be deprived of reasonable protection is one in name and nothing more."
t Regional Attorney, Federal Security Agency, Boston, Massachusetts.
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frequently expresses fear that individuals under the system will prefer
idleness and benefits to available work. Yet a provision found in every
state unemployment compensation law bars payments to a claimant
who without good cause refuses to accept available, suitable work.
The provision's universal existence is attributable, in part at least, to a
generally held concept that the purpose of an unemployment compensa-
tion law is to compensate for a wage loss due to unemployment result-
ing from a lack of work.1 Where a claimant without good cause refuses
suitable work, his immediate unemployment is not due to the absence
of suitable work opportunity.
Although the provision as it exists in the various laws does not differ
widely, it is not uniform. The difference of most general consequence
is in the result of a refusal. Some laws disqualify a claimant who has
refused suitable work for the duration of the ensuing unemployment, 2
others for a stated number of weeks or for a period to be imposed by
the agency within a minimum and a maximum set by statute.3 In
addition, some laws require that the maximum amount of benefits
payable to the claimant during the benefit year be reduced.- Those
laws which disqualify a claimant for a stated period, which in many
instances will be shorter than the period of ensuing unemployment,
were drafted on the theory that, as time intervenes, the efficient cause
of unemployment changes from the original refusal to the lack of a
suitable job opportunity. Examining the various types of provisions
in relation to their broad purpose, it is apparent that there is no direct
connection between this purpose and a requirement that the benefits
payable during the benefit year be reduced. Such a reduction fre-
quently will have effect in a period of unemployment following a
period of employment after disqualification where no proximate
causal connection exists betwveen the refusal and the then prevailing
unemployment.
The Offer.
Although the Wisconsin court in the Doughboy Mills case,5 in holding
that general knowledge of job openings was not a sufficient basis for
disqualification, left open the "interesting question" of whether an offer
1. The Rhode Island Cash Sickmess Insurance Act, 1942, c. 1209, exemplifie3 an act
where compensation is payable for unemployment due to involuntary cau:e3 other than
lack of work.
2. See, e.g., 3 C.L. GE,. LAws (Deering, 1944) Act 3780d, § 56(b), construed in
Whitcomb Hotel, Inc. v. California Employment Comm., 24 Cal. (2d) 753, 75S, 151 P.
(2d) 233, 236 (1944); 43 Pk. STAT. AN. (Purdon, 1941) § 302(a).
3. See, e.g., Maine Laws 1935, c. 192, § 5(c) (published vith Laws 1937).
4. See, e.g., Maine Laws 1935, c. 192, § 5(c), as amended by Laws 1939, c. 110.
5. Doughboy Mills, Inc. v. Industrial Comm., Wis. C. C., Dane Cy., Aug. 7, 1944,
CCH Unemployment Ins. Serv.-Wis. r 8190.
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contained in a "Help-Wanted" advertisement was an "offer" within
the statutory meaning, the statute appears to contemplate that the
offer be directed to and communicated to the claimant and not be a
general offer to all those qualified for the job.'
In addition to being particular, the offer should be definite; it should
be clear to the claimant that he is being asked to take a job, what the
conditions of the job are, and that acceptance or rejection is required.'
The offer should also concern presently existing employment, not an
employment prospect. Accordingly, where employees of a former plant
owner were told at the time of a temporary shutdown incident to the
sale of the plant that by filing application they might be hired again as
new employees on the plant's reopening, their failure to file was held no
refusal of an offer of work.8 If, however, the employer is seeking the
claimant as a replacement for a present job-holder, the fact that the
job is presently filled does not necessarily vitiate the offer.9
Moreover, an offer must be a bona fide attempt to secure the in-
dividual's services and not merely for the purpose of bringing about a
disqualification. 10 Questions of the bona fides of an offer normally
will arise where a former employer has reoffered a claimant his prior
job, since employers generally will not desire the services of one who
has been a dissatisfied or an unsatisfactory employee. Careful atten-
tion should be paid to the genuineness of an offer by an employer to a
former employee whom he has discharged or who has quit and who is
without special qualification for a job for which there is an adequate
labor supply, since an employer who has real need for a worker can
generally fill a job requiring no special skill without rehiring such an
employee. In this regard the timing and frequency of the offer may
also be pertinent. The offer may have been made only after the em-
6. See Ben. Ser. 3224-Neb. R (V3-4). In some states the offer must be made by the
employer through the public employment office. Under many laws, however, it may be
communicated directly to the claimant.
7. Ben. Ser. 2761-Neb. R (V3-2) (holding that asking a job applicant if he thought
he was capable of doing certain work was not an offer of employment). The same require-
ments apply to a referral. It must be definite and not a mere mention of job openings.
Nelson v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., Fla. C. C., Dade Cy., 1944, CCH Unemploy-
ment Ins. Serv.-Fla. 8082. Secondly, the claimant at the time of the referral interview
should be made aware of the job's character in sufficient detail to be able to form a general
though not a precise judgment of its suitability so that he may have grounds for refusing
a referral to a patently unsuitable job without being required to seek a more exact descrip.
tion in a company personnel office at a more distant point. Ibid.
8. Muncie Foundry Div. of Borg-Warner Corp. v. Review Bd., 114 Ind. App. 475,
51 N. E. (2d) 891 (1943).
9. Ben. Ser. 6567-Ohio R (V4-10).
10. Ben. Ser. 6771-Ill. R (V4-12); cf. Ben. Ser. 4953-Mo. A (V3-12). On the other
hand, an offer should not be found wanting where the employer wishes the claimant's serv-
ices merely on the ground that the employer has good reason to believe that the claimant
will reject the offer of employment which he is about to make.
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ployer has learned that the individual has filed for unemployment
compensation benefits, or it may have been made with such frequency
that it is questionable if a reasonable employer would continue to
offer a job to a former employee who had continually indicated his
unwillingness to work for the employer.
It may be that a claimant has found that a job makes him ill. In
such a case it seems that the fact of a claimant's refusal, unless there is
strong expert evidence to show that his condition has so changed that
illness would not result, should be deemed sufficient evidence of its
unsuitability. The mere fact that he has regained his health is not, it
would seem, a sufficient basis to hold the job suitable; the same condi-
tions which caused the original illness may be present. Furthermore,
there is some medical experience to prove that anxiety alone may be a
primary cause of many sicknesses.
In other instances, claimants may refuse jobs from which they had
previously voluntarily quit or from which they were laid off for lack of
work or from which they were discharged because of misconduct.
Certainly the mere fact that a claimant has voluntarily quit without
good cause or has been discharged for lack of work should not be con-
sidered sufficient evidence that the job is suitable on a reoffer; the
circumstances may have so changed that the job is no longer suitable.
Moreover, where an individual voluntarily quit an employer's service,
this fact alone may make any future relationship strained and result
in a finding that any job with that employer is unsuitable.
The Refusal.
Although the disqualification is conventionally referred to as that
for "refusal of suitable work," the claimant is disqualified
"if the commissioner finds that he has failed, without good cause,
either to apply for available, suitable work when so directed by the
employment office or the commissioner or to accept suitable work
when offered him, or to return to his customary self-employment
(if any) when so directed by the commissioner." 11
Furthermore, a claimant must exercise diligence in accepting an
offer or in applying for a job to which he is referred; otherwise he is
considered as having failed to act or as having refused.12 Even the
11. That portion of the typical section which includes the eo-called "labor standards
provision" and the factors to be adverted to in determining suitability vill ba found at
page 139.
Failure to return to self-employment, however, vill not be diseu-sed. Diqualifications
rarely are imposed by reason of this requirement, for directions to return to v2lf-employment
seldom are given.
12. He is not expected, however, to maintain himself in a state of constant and abso-
lute preparedness. Ben. Ser. 50S6-Conn. R. (V4-1)
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taking of a required action may not be sufficient, True compliance is
necessary; disqualification cannot be avoided by action designed to
prevent hiring or a referral. Thus one who misrepresents his training
and experience to avoid an offer or referral should be disqualified.
On the other hand, the statute makes it clear that when the failure
to act is due to good cause the claimant will not be disqualified. Thus,
one employed at the time of an offer of work normally may refuse
suitable work with impunity and, upon the later loss of existing em-
ployment, be held for the purpose of the provision to have had good
cause for refusal, since the purpose of the provision is to disqualify one
who elects to be or to remain unemployed. Where a termination notice
has been given, however, a different result may well obtain. Similarly,
disqualification may be imposed where one refuses a transfer to other
suitable work with his employer knowing that discharge will result.13
In these instances the existing employment may not be good cause for
refusal, and the individual, although employed, may be said to have
elected to be unemployed.
14
Suitability and the Labor Standards Provision.
Unless the work offered a claimant or to which he is referred is
"suitable," a failure to accept the offer or to pursue the referral will not
bring about disqualification.' 5 Most state laws contain a list of factors
'to be considered in determining suitability. The typical state law
provision reads:
13. It is not clear in all decisions that the employee who was disqualified for refusing a
transfer knew the refusal would bring about discharge or knew that his present job was
terminated. It would seem that a finding of disqualification would not be justified unless
one of these two conditions obtained, for only then can he be said to have elected to be
unemployed.
14. Some administrative decisions have held that an offer prior to actual termination
of employment is not effective to disqualify a claimant since the provision is construed to
require that the person be unemployed in order to be disqualified. That conclusion is based
upon those portions of the provision which state that a claimant may be directed to return
to customary self-employment and that in determining suitability the length of the claim-
ant's unemployment and prospect of securing local work are to be considered. Ben. Ser.
9075-Mich. A (VS-1).
15. Moreover, as has been previously pointed out, disqualification will not result unless
the refusal is "without good cause." The concepts of suitability and "without good cause"
are not identical. See page 138 supra for an example of a situation where an offered job may
be entirely suitable for an individual, but he will have good cause for refusing it. In many
situations, however, no sharp line of distinction can be drawn between them; that which
makes a job unsuitable will also constitute good cause for refusal. Since this is true of the
situations subsequently discussed, the terminology used in decisions will not be strictly
adhered to and work, the refusal of which will bring about a disqualification, will be referred
to as suitable, or if disqualification will not result, as unsuitable. It should be borne in mind,
however, that "good cause" is a broader term than "suitable," and although an individual
may have "good cause" for refusing all "unsuitable work," all work that he has "good
cause" for refusing is not necessarily unsuitable.
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"In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an in-
dividual, the commissioner shall consider the degree of risk involved
to his health, safety and morals, his physical fitness and prior
training, his experience and prior earnings, his length of unemploy-
ment and prospects for securing local work in his customary occu-
pation, and the distance of the available work from his residence."
In addition, all state laws contain provisions corresponding to those in
Section 1603(a) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code,'1 commonly referred
to as the "labor standards provision." A typical provision reads:
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, no work
shall be deemed suitable and benefits shall not be denied under this
Act to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new
work under any of the following conditions: (a) If the position
offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor
dispute; (b) if the -ages, hours, or other conditions of the work
offered are less favorable to the individual than those prevailing
for similar work in the locality; (c) if as a condition of being em-
ployed the individual would be required to join a company union
or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor or-
ganization." 17
The suitability provision should be considered as specifically direct-
ing attention to the enumerated factors, but not as precluding other
relevant elements from the determination. Such an interpretation
gives full effect to the fact that that which is to be determined is the
suitability of the job for the claimant.lS Some elements generally
adverted to by state agencies, the administrative tribunals, and the
courts in determining suitability will be discussed below, vith stress
being laid upon those which, it seems, will be of greatest importance
in the postwar period.
1. Working Conditions, Hours of Work, Safety and tIcaltk. The
second clause of the labor standards provision in effect renders a job
16. 49 STAT. 640 (1935), 26 U. S. C. § 1603(a)(5).
17. Section 1603(a)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code begins: "Compmnsation dhall
not be denied in such state to any otherwise eligible individual for refuing to accept new
work under any of the following conditions: . . . ." The labor standards pro,ison appear-
ing in most state laws differs from the federal provision by providing that "no vork" Ehall
be suitable if one of the conditions specified attaches to such work. The large difference
between the labor standards provision and the suitability provision is that the former pro-
hibits disqualification and in effect makes a finding of unsuitability mandatory if one of the
conditions specified attaches to new work, or in states with the broader clause to any work,
whereas the latter enumerates factors to be scrutinized in judging suitability. No relative
weight, however, is given to these factors; each must be assigned its own importance in the
particular circumstance.
18. The wording of some state laws requires this construction by the addition of a
phrase "there shall be considered among other factors." See, e.g., 5 N. D. Rrv. Coin
(1943) § 52-0636.
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unsuitable if the wages, hours, or other working conditions are sub-
stantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for
similar work in the locality. State laws do not usually, other than in
this provision, specifically refer to working conditions or hours of work,
but the suitability provision does require consideration of the effect
hours and other working conditions may have on the individual. Thus,
the claimant's health may indicate that work out-of-doors is unsuitable,
or that a job requiring overtime is too exhausting. In the same manner,
the claimant's safety may demand a broader scrutiny of hours or other
working conditions than does the labor standards provision since, al-
though these conditions may be better for the individual than condi-
tions prevailing for similar work in the locality, they may not be com-
patible with the security of one in the claimant's condition.
Consideration of the enumerated factors of risk to the claimant's
health and safety and of his physical fitness for the job may be largely
interrelated in the case of handicapped individuals. Even in the case
of one in good physical condition, the circumstances attendant on the
job may be such that considerations of health or safety will preclude
its being held suitable. Unless, however, the work is of a special char-
acter, such as highly hazardous work "I or work which generally re-
quires performance under unfavorable conditions, the decision in such a
circumstance normally will rest on the second clause of the labor
standards provision, for the conditions of work usually will be sub-
stantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for
similar work in the locality.
2. Wages, Experience, Prior Training, and Loss of Skill. The second
clause of the labor standards provision also enjoins disqualification if
wages are substantially less favorable to the individual than those for
similar local work. As in the case of hours and working conditions, the
suitability provision sets up a different basis of comparison: the in-
dividual's "prior earnings." "Prior earnings" should be construed as
requiring comparison of the net earnings over the usual pay period of
the job offered with the net earnings of the individual's prior employ-
ment over the same period. It should not be construed, however, as
precluding a finding that a job is unsuitable if it will be necessary for
the individual to work substantially longer hours than he had pre-
viously worked to acquire the same net earnings. In other words, the
true meaning of the wage to the claimant should be considered.
When the suitability of a job which will result in lower earnings is
to be determined, other elements detailed in the suitability provision
19. Although highly hazardous work may be found unsuitable for most claimants,
where a claimant has pursued such an occupation and acquired such skill in the application
of its techniques that the danger is negligible or reduced to a minimum, a job offered him
in such occupation generally it seems, would be held suitable unless there is the interven-
tion of some new fact which alters the aspect of its suitability.
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must be scrutinized, including length of unemployment and the pros-
pect of other employment. It is not the intent of the system to lower
an individual's standard of employment. The nature of the employ-
ment market, the duration of unemployment, and prospects of securing
employment in the claimant's customary occupation, and thus the
obsolescence of his trade, all must be considered as closely interwoven
factors in making a judgment of suitability."I Where the job is at a
lower skill than that which gave rise to the higher earnings, the in-
dividual's training and experience and the possible loss of skill will also
enter into consideration.21
Though the wages for a job are normal for that work in that locality,
they may not be sufficient to afford the claimant a living wage. This
fact should receive real consideration, for otherwise not only may the
purpose of the suitability provision be perverted, but a true social mal-
adjustment may be fostered.22 This maladjustment can be alleviated
by the unemployment compensation system since the claimant will
have a greater opportunity to seek better employment while in benefit
status than while employed. Such an opportunity should be afforded a
claimant if his training and experience give any indication that it may
be fruitful.
The war has brought with it a generally higher individual earning
level resulting from overtime and from individuals working at higher
skills than those at which they were previously employed; as a conse-
quence, the factor of "prior earnings" as well as the factor "training
and experience" will become more crucial in determinations of suitabil-
ity during the reconversion period. Postwar jobs at lesser skills and
lesser pay may be offered claimants. It is quite obvious that if an in-
dividual had been working at the same skill and rate as before the war
and thus his higher earnings have been solely the result of overtime,
he cannot be heard to object to a job offer merely because the job does
not afford an opportunity for overtime work. In those situations in
which the individual's prior earnings have been increased due to his
working at a higher skill, however, different factors are present. While
there may be a natural tendency to generalize that his skill and in-
creased earning capacity is the result of a wartime phenomenon, and
thus that the higher earnings and the experience and training acquired
at such jobs are unreliable criteria in judging suitability, such a gen-
eralization, of course, is unfounded. Skills and the resulting earning
20. Note the factors bearing on "suitability" in Bowman v. Tray Launderers & Clean-
ers, Inc., 215 Minn. 226, 9 N. W. (2d) 506 (1943).
21. Where an individual must be downgraded care should be taken to keep him work-
ing in the path of his usual skill.
22. Some laws specify that work shall not be suitable unless the veekly wage exceds
the weekly unemployment compensation benefit amount. Co,... GE!.'. STAT. (Supp. 1939)
§ 1339e, as amended by GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1941) § 713f(b)(1).
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capacity -attained during a war are as real as like skills and capacity
gained at any other time. Thus, unless employment at such skills is
not a reasonable prospect, a judgment that a job at a lower skill or rate
is unsuitable would seem to be required.
It is recognized that at the onset of a reconversion period job oppor-
tunities will be considerably less than they were in the immediately
preceding period. Job openings, however, will be available for some
skills, and job opportunities for others will follow as reconversion pro-
ceeds. Although the large demands of local industries for some skills
will be predictable by employment security agencies, the agencies
usually will not be in a position immediately to know with exactitude
what, when, or where demands for particular skills will occur in a period
when new industries and new techniques may be anticipatedl It seems
reasonable, therefore, that work at a lesser skill and lower wages should
not be deemed suitable unless a claimant has been given a reasonable
period in which to compete in the labor market for available jobs at his
higher skill or related skillsi or, where such skills are not immediately
required, that a reasonable duration of benefits be afforded him im-
mediately after the beginning of reconversion until the demands of
industry are predictable and it can be said that industry will have no
need in the near future for such skill. To do otherwise would be to
disregard the purpose of the provision and to force some individuals
into work below their highest skills from which point they could not
effectively compete for jobs when available.
The necessity of making a large number of determinations uniformly
may create a tendency to develop rules of thumb for measuring the
duration of the reasonable period. Although such rules are useful
expedients in an administrative process, they should not be substituted
for sound judgment. Suitability depends in many cases on a bulk of
factors. Any device such as a sliding scale which would allow specific
periods of benefits before specified wage reductions are required ap-
pears too inexact and inflexible unless it is to be used as a most general
kind of guide. Even in such a case, extreme care should be taken to
supervise its use so that claims examiners will not rely on it rather
than on judgment. The statute makes it clear that relevant considera-
tions should be adverted to and that each case should be judged on the
basis of its individual facts.
Looking at the major adjustments which some individuals must
make in this period, it seems reasonable to predict that in many cases
the reasonable period will be of long duration, that frequently it may
be for the claimant's entire benefit duration. Where a claimant is
confronted with major adjustments, it seems more logical that he be
allowed benefits for his entire duration to make these adjustments as
best he can than that he be required to obtain subsistence by accepting
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a job which will force him into a pattern where these adjustments will
be impossible or at least extremely difficult. The fact that there is a
durational limit on the number of weeks of benefits that may be paid
in a year in itself limits reasonably the period in which an individual
may be expected to work out his own problem arising from his unem-
ployment. When considered together with the suitability provision,
the limitation strongly indicates that work was intended to be viewed
as unsuitable even though the entire duration of benefits must be paid
if such individual adjustments could not be made or could be made
only at a sacrifice.
3. Union Relations. The large-scale employment shifts which Aill
occur after the beginning of reconversion may confront agencies vith
many cases in which an individual belonging to one bona fide labor
organization is offered a job in an establishment having a "closed-shop
agreement" with another such group. The requirement that one join
other than a company union as a condition of being employed does not
come within the terms of the third clause of the labor standards provi-
sion, yet agencies confronted with such a circumstance may wish to
maintain strict neutrality as between rival unions or may desire to
allow individuals in such cases freedom of union affiliation. The follow-
ing quotation from an Iowa referee's decision 23 sets forth appropriate
criteria to accomplish these purposes:
"A requirement to join a union as a condition of being em-
ployed or being continued in employment should be deemed to
render the employment unsuitable or constitute good cause for
leaving it, if claimant is a member of a rival bona fide labor organi-
zation and objects in principle to joining the new organization, or
considers his obligation toward his own organization inconsistent
with membership in the new organization, or would be required, as
a condition of being employed or by the rules of the old or new
organization, to give up his membership in the old organization
in the event of so joining."
If a claimant is required "as a condition of being employed" to resign
from a bona fide labor organization, the third clause of the labor stand-
ards provision would enjoin disqualification. Where, on the other
hand, expulsion from a labor organization will follow upon an in-
dividual's taking a job to be performed under conditions contrary to
union rules, the clause would not apply, for, although some decisions
have stated that expulsion is tantamount to resignation, -* expulsion
is a result of being employed and is not required "as a condition of
being employed." It would appear, however, that a finding should be
23. Ben. Ser. 8073-Iowa R (V6-7).
24. Ben. Ser. 8283-N.C. R (V6-12) (holding claimant had good caume for refual where
expulsion would result).
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made that the individual has good cause for refusing such employment.
There can be little doubt that loss of status in his union and the at-
tendant consequences will be a substantial harm to him and thus a
sufficiently good cause for his refusal. Nor would it appear pertinent
to inquire into the reasonableness of the union rule that would bring
about the expulsion. The harm to the individual will occur, and, there-
fore, the good cause will exist whether the union rule is reasonable or
unreasonable.
Moreover, where a claimant will be expelled from his union for
performing work under certain conditions and where such conditions
do not obtain for similar work in the locality, and, therefore, the same
result would not follow if he were to accept such similar work, a finding
that he is not disqualified may be mandatory under the second clause
of the labor standards provision; it may be necessary to find that the
"conditions of work" are substantially less favorable to the individual
than those prevailing for similar work in the locality.2"
4. Moral and Religious Objection. The usual suitability clause states
that risk to a claimant's morals shall be considered in making determi-
nations thereunder. This element is frequently viewed broadly to give
effect to one's moral precepts regardless of their consistency with
prevailing ethical standards. Such a view is entirely consistent with
the democratic principle of freedom of thought and religion. In order
to make the work unsuitable, however, the connection between the
condition pertaining to the job and the claimant's moral principle
should be direct and not fanciful or nebulous. Thus, although it has
been frequently and properly held that one who believed the sale and
consumption of liquor immoral was not obliged under the pain of dis-
qualification to accept a job in a liquor vending establishment, it would
not appear that the same result should obtain where the claimant's
objection is merely that an employee working at the same establish-
ment is addicted to drink. No true feeling of participating in wrong-
doing would arise from his working under these conditions.
5. Distance. The factor of distance is another of those enumerated
in the suitability provision. It relates in two ways to the distance of
the offered work from the claimant's home: (1) the time and cost of
travel to and from work, and (2) whether the work is so far distant that
it would be necessary to move from the present home. Where work for
miners was nearly 175 miles from their homes, the Colorado Supreme
Court held the work unsuitable despite the urging of wartime condi-
tions and the shortage of miners, thus, in effect, refusing to allow the
use of the system as a manpower control. 2
6
25. Attention should also be called to problems that arise under clause one of the
labor standards provision, such as whether the job is vacant due directly to a labor dispute.
26. Industrial Comm. v. Parra, 111 Colo. 69, 137 P. (2d) 405 (1943).
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Several decisions have been handed down within the last few years "
which hold that if a claimant voluntarily quits a job and puts distance
between himself and it, the job on a reoffer must be considered suitable.
In the Alabamia Textile Products case the claimant quit her job in
Alabama because she -wished to join her husband in New York. On
filing an interstate claim in New York, she was disqualified because she
refused her old job which had been reoffered her. In the Feucldenbergcr
case, the claimant quit his job in West Virginia, moved from the state,
obtained employment and was disqualified when he refused an offer
of his old job in West Virginia after the employment he had obtained
had terminated because of lack of work. These decisions can have an
extensive effect in the postwar reconversion period. War industries
have drawn on a countrywide labor supply. Many individuals, their
patriotism appealed to by the United States Employment Service
and employers, have left their home localities to work in areas where
essential industries are located. When the need for producing war
materials ceases, there will be those who, though they could have
stayed on to assist in reconversion, will have voluntarily quit to go
back home. Later, while waiting for work or while unemployed follow-
ing a period of employment, they may be offered their old job or a
similar job in the reconverted plant of their former employer. Such
facts point up more clearly the character of the country's labor market
and the resulting fundamental wealmess of the rule, maling it evident
that a decision has been reached that brings into the system a paro-
chialism out of concert with its national character.
3
Freedom of movement within the labor market, whether induced by
initiative or personal necessity, must have been contemplated; if
evidence of this is needed it is found in the fact that all state laws male
provision for allowing the agency to enter into reciprocal agreements
to pay interstate claims. It is reasonable to believe that the disqualifi-
cation for voluntary quitting is the sole manifestation of the manner in
which such freedom, so long as one stays within the labor market, is
27. Ex parte Alabama Textile Products Corp., 242 Ala. 609, 7 S. (2d) 303 (1942);
United States Coal & Coke Co. v. Board of Rev., AN. Va. C. C., Kanawha Cy., April 3, 1943
CCH Unemployment Ins. Serv.-NW. Va. T 1965.022; Feuchtenberger Bakeries, Inc. v.
Board of Rev., NV. Va. C. C., Kanawha Cy., April 15, 1943, ibid.
28. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 54S (1937). The following statement
by the court in the United States Coal & Coke case, cited supra note 27, heightens the feel-
ing that the court took into account the effect the decision would have on local intcrests:
"I am of the opinion that each of the claimants who voluntarily and without
good cause gave up a position which was then, and continued to be, available to
him in this State, and who refused to return to West Virginia to accept this avail-
able employment, is barred from receiving benefits under our Unemployment Com-
pensation law. In each of these cases the claimant has, without caue, by his volun-
tary act, placed distance between him and continuously available work in this
state."
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to be considered incompatible with payment of benefits. But the
period of this disqualification had run in these cases, and the courts
seem thus by the application of the rule to have extended it. Two con-
siderations appear to have led to this result. In the United States Coal
& Coke case, the West Virginia circuit judge, after considering the
voluntary character of the person's departure from the locality of his
former job, said, "As I view it the beneficient objects and purposes of
our statute relative to involuntary unemployment cannot be extended
to cover such claims." 29
Similarly, in the Alabama Textile Products case, the court stated:
"The Act is specific that the work is not suitable if the board
finds that it unduly risks '[her] health, safety, and morals, [and her]
physical fitness.' So that if her employment is so affected, she
would not be chargeable with voluntary unemployment if she quits
it. But if her previous work is available and suitable and she
without one of those causes, enumerated above, voluntarily puts
distance between her and it, she cannot complain that such distance
has rendered that job unsuitable.
"... She can voluntarily select her place of residence and
change it at will, within or without the State, and would not be
required to accept work at a former residence which was not suita-
ble on account of its distance from her present residence, provided
she did not leave that job and voluntarily put the distance between
her and it, without some cause which is considered good under the
Act." 30
Thus, it seems fair to infer that each court viewed the claimant's un-
employment as arising from his act and as to some degree wilful or
voluntary. But this was rather a matter of voluntary quitting followed
by involuntary unemployment. In addition to implying that this claim-
ant's unemployment was due to his act or fault, thd Alabama court,
whose decision was cited with approval by the West Virginia court in
the United States Coal & Coke case, spoke of the payment of benefits
penalizing the employer,3' thus implying that an employer who was
not at fault in causing the unemployment should not be charged on~his
29. Ibid. (emphasis supplied).
30. Ex parte Alabama Textile Products Corp., 242 Ala. 609, 616-7, 7 S. (2d) 303,
309-10 (1942).
31. In the Alabama Textile Products case, 242 Ala. 609, 618, 7 S. (2d) 303, 310-1, the
court stated:
". ... The fact would remain that she failed to accept suitable employment,
and though as between her and her husband, there was good cause for doing so, it
was not so under the terms of the Act, as between her and her employer, so as to
penalize him and his other employees in order to maintain a well-ordered home, not
to maintain a status of employment."
(The reference to employees no doubt arises from the fact that contributions are re-
quired of employees in Alabama.)
